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Abstract
Is gift-exchange inevitably to be crowded out by impersonal market
exchange? The presence of a thick-market externality indicates that
this is indeed likely to be the case. But reciprocity or gift-exchange
induces social relations. The utility function is extended in order
to take account of social relations in the form of symbolic utility or
moral sentiments. As long as moral sentiments are valued high enough
it is shown that both market and gift-exchange can coexist. The
spontaneous order need not necessarily select the most e¢cient market
size however.
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1Nous nous quittâmes en…n très contents les uns des autres, et cet
après-midi fut un de ceux de ma vie dont je me rappelle le souvenir
avec le plus de satisfaction. La fête au reste ne fut pas ruineuse, pour
trente sous qu’il m’en coûta tout au plus, il y eut pour plus de cent
écus de contentement. Tant il est vrai que le vrai plaisir ne se mesure
pas sur la dépense et que la joie est plus amie des liards que des louis.
(J.J. Rousseau - Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire, 1782)1
1 Introduction
Reciprocal exchange in its pure form can be observed in special places where
the market is not strong enough to break personal connections. There are fas-
cinating stories by anthropologists showing how reciprocal exchange arrange-
ments vanish when tribes encounter markets. In an interesting paper Kranton
[16] shows that in order to become bene…cial, markets need enough partic-
ipants to reduce search costs. Therefore, reciprocal exchange may survive
if initially the proportion of the people that engage in market exchange is
not too large. There are other determinants which may tip over the balance
in favor of market exchange, such as a lack of trust. In reciprocal exchange
people have to trust each other, because production and consumption are
separated over time. Moreover, reciprocal exchange may involve a less elab-
orate division of labor.
Kranton [16] borrows evidence documented by Yellen [20] that describes
how the !Kung tribe abandoned reciprocal exchange once they encountered
the market economy of Botswana. But reciprocal exchange is not limited
to ”savage-like” communities nor to some corners of the economy but is an
element of importance in developed market economies as well. Reciprocity
or gift exchange is an essential aspect of culture. There is a moral dimension
to economics so to say, as stressed by Etzioni [10]. Even Adam Smith already
knew that ”moral sentiments” are important, something also recognized by
Kenneth Arrow : ”ethical behavior can be regarded as a socially desirable
1Eventually we separated very pleased, and that afternoon was one out of my
life that I remember with most satisfaction. The party turned out not to be
ruinous, for the thirty penny that it cost me at most, one had satisfaction for more
than hundred thalers. So it is true that genuine pleasure cannot be measured
by its expenses and that a crown gives more happines than a gold coin. (Our
translation.)
2institution which facilitates the achievement of economic e¢ciency in a broad
sense” (Arrow [2], p. 354). People have a sense of belonging to society at
large, inducing cooperative behavior in di¤erent guises. Self-interest seeking
behavior is a sine qua non for coordination in the economy, but there are
limits to opportunistic behavior. People want to be respected by others. To a
certain extent respect follows from success in the accumulation of wealth, but
there are limits to respect-fullness in this sense. Mutual aid and sympathy
are important values of their own. For this reason producers may take pride
in the quality of the product they deliver, workers may be motivated to do a
good job and people in general may take account of each other’s interests in
di¤erent situations. Experiments in economic settings indeed con…rm that
people may behave di¤erent from what standard neo-classical economics pre-
dicts. Take for instance, Gächter and Fehr [14] who …nd that social approval
and social familiarity generate a signi…cant rise in cooperative behavior.
Economists have not yet settled the way in which the moral dimension
can be handled. At one extreme, the moral dimension is seen as belonging to
a value domain that is incommensurable with traditional economic activities
(e.g. Etzioni [10]; Van Staveren [19]). There is no role for reciprocity to
play here since people act according to their conviction, not as a strategic
act to evoke similar behaviour of others. At the other extreme, moral values
are interpreted as preferences to be handled in the same way as all other
preferences (e.g. Becker [6]). If people make certain choices it is because
that set of choices maximizes their utility.
In this paper we take sides. First, we think that moral behavior and gift
exchange contain an important element of reciprocity. People stick to such
behavior because others do so, and because one is treated by the others in
the same way as they do. Second, we argue that there is more than that
because people have moral preferences, thus attaching value to the way in
which society is organised. Therefore, moral values can be traded-o¤ against
other values in terms of some notion of generalized utility. In the same vein
Frey [12] notes that intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by introducing
monetary incentives.2
The role of moral preferences is discussed also in Khalil [15]. The author
2Arrow [3] points out that the ”typical examples designed to show the absurdity or
immorality of assigning a money value to activities are based on …nite changes” (p. 759,
emphasize added). He argues further that it is not a characteristic of utility functions that
everything has a price, at least not of utility functions that are bounded.
3distinguishes substantive and symbolic utility. Substantive utility relates
to material tastes in the normal sense, whereas symbolic utility stands for
tastes which a¢rm selfhood like self-integrity and self-respect3. Khalil main-
tains that both types of utility are commensurable but makes no attempt at
formalizing this idea. In the remaining of this paper we adopt Khalil’s termi-
nology, thus stressing the relevance of di¤erent dimensions in utility. People
take measure if they decide to abandon moral behavior in favor of pure self-
seeking behavior. Crowding-out presupposes commensurability. This holds
true for the analysis of Frey as well as in a more general approach to the
problem of motivation.
Casual observation shows that people -at least in Europe- are concerned
about a loss of morality in recent time. This is often associated with com-
modi…cation, meaning that markets are expanding into almost every territory
of human life. In our terminology this means that the market system crowds
out reciprocal exchange, bringing about a lack of close personal relationships.
The questions to be answered are then the following. What are the main fac-
tors causing such a crowding-out? Is reciprocal exchange in the sense of
moral behavior completely wiped out or are there conditions such that both
regimes can coexist in equilibrium? To answer these questions we apply the
analytical framework based on Kranton [16] and Diamond [8] in a modi…ed
way and with a di¤erent interpretation. In the model used people can make
a deliberate choice between two regimes. In reciprocal exchange agents value
moral behavior as they have a sense of belonging to society at large. They
produce goods from which they derive substantive utility, but sticking to the
moral codes of the group provides also satisfaction in the form of symbolic
utility. Initially we assume that the terms of trade between substantive and
symbolic utility are deteriorating over time. Extending the model later on, it
will be argued that the terms of trade typically depend in a non-linear way on
the fraction of agents engaged in reciprocal exchange. More speci…cally, we
assume that people value the market system relatively high if the number of
participants is relatively low but gradually change their mind as the market
comes to dominate the scene.
In the regime of market exchange agents behave as prescribed in neo-
classical theory. If the fraction of agents engaged in pure market activities
rises, the market operates more e¢ciently. People are then less hampered by
3Compare the so called ’framing e¤ects’ and ’intrinsic versus extrinsic motivations’,
related terms that are borrowed from social psychology (see Bowles, [7]).
4tradition and can seize every opportunity for making a pro…t. The division of
labor can be exploited more fully. The set of goods produced generally di¤ers
from that in case of reciprocal exchange. This has an impact on substantive
utility. The idea that market e¢ciency is related to the number of people
in the market is characteristic for search models. We generalize this idea
by assuming that more encounters between people induce more production
by leveling organizational and institutional restrictions. However, both ideas
can be modelled in the same manner.
The model applied here di¤ers in a number of aspects from that in Kran-
ton [16]. First, in modelling the search externality we follow the original
set-up of Diamond [8],[9] more closely. Second, to simplify further we as-
sume that goods are produced at constant cost instead of introducing a dis-
tribution from which agents draw randomly. Finally, it should be observed
that we not only obtain corner solutions as in Kranton. Assuming that the
terms of trade between regimes depend on the fraction of agents engaged
in the market system we …nd interior solutions with agents operating under
di¤erent regimes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1 we …rst
specify what is meant by sympathy and substantive utility. This sets the
stage for modelling reciprocal exchange in section 2.2. Market exchange
is discussed in section 2.3. In section 3 we consider equilibrium solutions
under di¤erent assumptions with respect to the shape of symbolic utility.
Complete commodi…cation obtains in section 3.1. Interior solutions with
partial commodi…cation are considered in section 3.2. The role of discounting
is scrutinized in section 3.3. Welfare considerations are taken up in section 4.
The paper closes with concluding remarks in section 5. Proofs of propositions
are deferred to the appendix.
2 Exchange Mechanisms
In this section we describe the formal model. The general setup is one in
which each agents starts in a situation in which he is involved in a personal
relationship with one other agent. A key feature of such a reciprocal ex-
change relationship is the element of trust. Production and consumption are
typically separated over time. Contrary to the market where money serves
as a medium of exchange, no such security exists in a reciprocal relationship.
It is therefore possible that agents who did produce last period see their rela-
5tionship end without having the possibility of consuming in return. Although
this favors the existence of markets, market exchange has disadvantages of
its own. The market is typically characterized by anonymous agents, without
relation-speci…c commitments, and search costs have to be made in order to
…nd a trading partner. On the other hand is it generally acknowledged that
the market is capable of supplying a larger array of goods.
Before turning to a detailed exposition we present an outline in Figure 1.
This facilitates the reading of the subsequent sections. The arrows denote
possible ‡ows. Agents start in a reciprocal exchange relationship. They can
end their relationship and enter the market as unemployed. The distribution
of agents in each period is given by the fractions r;u; and m that correspond
to the di¤erent states as in the …gure. The market is characterized by a
search process that describes how agents become employed with a good, sell
that good and become unemployed again. This search process is determined
by the technical parameters a and b to be explained later on.
We start with an exposition of reciprocal exchange and postpone a treat-
ment of the market part to the next section. First however, we discuss the












2.1 Substantive and Symbolic Utility
Following Khalil [15] we distinguish between substantive utility (ordinary
tastes for material goods) and symbolic utility (tastes for selfhood and alike).
6Consumers derive substantive utility from a basket of goods, which may dif-
fer across regimes. Substantive utility for each representative consumer is
denoted by xi, where the index i = r;m denotes reciprocal or market ex-
change. Symbolic utility can be taken into account by introducing extended
preferences (see for instance Becker [6]). Here we take a short-cut by intro-
ducing a mark-up (µi) on substantive utility. Extended utility is then de…ned
as:
yi = µixi; µi ¸ 1; i = r;m:
It is assumed that under market exchange extended utility coincides with
substantive utility (µm = 1). Reciprocal exchange conveys symbolic utility as
people value social interaction as such (µr > 1). The above set of equations
can be combined to:
yr = µym; (1)
where µ ´ (µrxr)=xm:As substantive utility is …xed xr and xm can be
treated as constants. It seems plausible to assume that µr, and therefore µ,
depends on the fraction of people engaged in market exchange, m. If the
number of people in gift exchange declines it will be harder to uphold a sense
of community spirit. As the market regimes expands, individualism spreads
and solidarity may become less attractive. These considerations lead to a
negative relation between the valuation ratio µ and the fraction of people in
the market regime. However, according to Adam Smith it can be maintained
that the need for mutual sympathy and respect is deep-rooted and cannot be
suppressed entirely. A similar view based on biological principles is expressed
in Kropotkin [17]. It is not unreasonable to assume that the rami…cation
of this becomes more distressing as the market gets to dominate exchange
relations. This could imply a positive relation between µ and the market size
after some threshold level of market participation has been passed. Thus we
have that µ = µ(m) is …rst decreasing and after some critical point, say m0,
increasing, because the market becomes ”too large”.
More speci…cally, the U-shaped µ(m)-curve can be seen as the result of
opposite forces. First, as more people leave the regime of reciprocity the cost
(in disutility terms) of changing beliefs for the remaining people decline. This
idea builds on the literature on cognitive dissonance in psychology. Follow-
ing Festinger [11] it can be stated that changing beliefs induces a negative
arousal. Moreover, the resistance to change crucially depends on the dif-
…culty of …nding people who support the new belief. Therefore, the more
people are already in the market regime the easier it becomes for people to
7switch regimes. It is in particular hard for the …rst few individuals that are
to switch. This is shown by the dashed downward sloping RC-curve (resis-
tance to change) in Figure 2 . Second, as the market system expands the
social de…cit increases. As argued in Bowles [7] markets are characterised by
impersonality and ephemerality of contact. But people also want to socialize.
There is a need for mutual sympathy and recognition. If reciprocal exchange
is relatively large market participants may have the feeling that the social
de…cit can be easily repaired. The more people are available as potential
candidates to socialise with, the easier it is to change back to reciprocal ex-
change. Therefore, the opportunity costs (in disutility terms) of switching to
the market regime increase as the market system becomes more dominant.
The social de…cit is felt more heavily. This gives rise to the dashed upward
sloping SD-curve (social de…cit) in Figure 2 . Under appropriate conditions
the summation of both curves may lead to an U-shaped function µ(m) as
illustrated by the bold curve in Figure 2. To analyse di¤erent possibilities,
the equilibrium solution discussed in section 3.1 will be based on a monotonic
decreasing µ-curve. This case eventuates in the corners as the only solutions.
The U-shaped µ-curve will be introduced in section 3.2. As it turns out, this





It should be noted that there is a close parallel with the descriptive ap-
proach of Fukuyama [11]. In his latest book Fukuyama describes ”the great
8disruption” of the social system starting somewhere in the sixties under in-
‡uence of the upcoming information technology. The change of a traditional
industrial society towards an economy dominated by the service sector leads
to a certain disorientation and as a consequence of this to a decay of moral
values. But according to the author things have changed lately. The reason is
that human nature is geared towards cooperation and reciprocity. Fukuyama
bases his view on the biological approach going back to Kropotkin [17]. The
reconstruction of the social order is re‡ected in declining criminality statis-
tics and positive evaluation of social relations in systematic surveys. Such a
change may lead to a new equilibrium with a certain amount of gift exchange
in the current market economy. In our model it is the upward sloping branch
of the µ(m) curve which re‡ects the views of Fukuyama and others on the
viability of the moral system in modern times.
2.2 Reciprocal Exchange
The timing in a reciprocal exchange relationship is as follows. Each two
periods a complete reciprocal gift exchange can be accomplished. In the
…rst period, one of the agents produces …rst and the other consumes the
good. In the second period they switch roles. Whenever they consume, they
derive utility yr, and whenever they produce they bear a cost in disutility
terms of c4. The discount factor for the next period equals ± = e¡½ , where
½ is the subjective discount rate.5 Agents are in…nitely lived. Let Vrp and
Vrc denote the lifetime discounted utility of the agent that is involved in
reciprocal exchange and starts as producer and consumer respectively. The
agent starting as a producer incurs a cost (c) and expects to be in the position
of a consumer next period:
Vrp = ¡c + ±Vrc:
Similarly, the lifetime discounted utility of the agent that starts as con-
sumer, Vrc; is given by:
Vrc = yr + ±Vrp:
4For simplicity we assume that the complete production of an individual is ex-
changed. A more realistic extension would be that individuals exchange only part of
their production.
5A natural restriction on the discount factor is that ± 2 (0;1): future revenues are
valued positively but less than current revenues.
9It is further assumed that each agent ends up being …rst consumer or
producer with equal probability. Expected discounted lifetime utility is then
given by Vr = 1





The element of trust is introduced by the possibility of ending the rela-
tionship. An agent can decide to consume …rst, but not to produce in return.
He then consumes and enters the market. Whenever he does, the other agent
will of course take notice of being cheated and as a punishment he will end
the relationship6. As a consequence, both agents will have to enter the mar-
ket. Obviously, the agent will deliberate upon producing in order to sustain
the relationship or to cheat upon his partner. Whether the agents decide to
cheat and enter the market or stay in the reciprocal exchange relationship
is dependent on the derived utility of being in the market regime, Vu (to be
speci…ed later on), and of the derived utility in the reciprocal exchange re-
lationship, Vr. The following de…nition shows a Nash-equilibrium constraint
under which both agents will decide not to cheat (a derivation is given in the
appendix).
De…nition 1 (enforceability) A reciprocal exchange relationship is en-
forceable if ¡c + ±Vr(¢) ¸ Vu(¢).
The constraint is more likely to be satis…ed when the discount factor is
high (low subjective discount rate) or when the market size is small. The
higher the future is valued, the less bene…cial it is to cheat and so recipro-
cal exchange is more easily enforceable. Alternatively, we can interpret the
subjective discount factor as a measure of trust. If the discount factor is
low, then the faith in getting consumption in return is poor. The lower the
discount factor, the harder it is to uphold the relationship. The market, on
the other hand, is characterized by increasing returns to scale. The larger
the market, the more easy it is to …nd a partner to trade with. This im-
plies that the value of trading on the market is positively dependent on the
6This tit-for-tat is only one of many possible strategies. The strategy is common in the
microeconomic literature. The classic defence is given in Axelrod [4]. More interestingly,
the strategy is defended by Aristotle on principles of justice: ”Now if proportionate equality
between the products be …rst established, (...) then reciprocation take place (...) but if
this is not done, the bargain is not equal, and intercourse does not continue.” (Aristotle
[1], p. 283).
10market size7. The enforceability constraint is therefore harder to satisfy at
larger market sizes. Detailed comparative statics are provided in section 3.3.
We now turn our attention to the determination of the value of entering the
market.
2.3 Market Exchange
Agents that have decided to enter the market do not have a …xed trading
partner. They enter the market ”unemployed”, that is with no goods, and
have to search for production possibilities. This will be represented by a
Poisson process with arrival rate a. They can either accept or not accept the
production opportunity. After they have found and accepted one they bear
the same disutility costs c as in reciprocal exchange. Being employed they still
have to search someone to trade with. They …nd someone with probability
b(m). Having found a trade partner they exchange and derive utility ym:8
The market is characterized by increasing returns to scale in the form of an
externality. As the fraction of the population on the market, m, gets larger,
average search time decreases or equivalently b
0(m) > 0: Recall that r;u;m
are the fractions of the population in reciprocal exchange, unemployed on the
market, and employed on the market respectively (see also Figure 1). If we
normalize total population to unity then u = 1¡ r ¡ m. The ‡ow dynamics
in the market can then be described by the di¤erential equation:
_ m = a(1 ¡ r ¡ m) ¡ b(m) ¢ m: (3)
Here, _ m ´ dm=dt: The fraction of people on the market increases with
the number of agents …nding a production possibility and decreases with the
number of agents accomplishing their exchange.
In the remainder of the paper the focus is on steady state solutions.
Steady states are marked by a constant distribution of agents over states,
hence we have a constant rate of employment: _ m = 0. Based on this assump-
tion we can derive the value equations of the agents on the market. Let Vu and
Vm denote the discounted lifetime utility of being unemployed and employed
7From (4) introduced later in the text, it is easily proved that Vu is indeed (weakly)
increasing in m:
8The market is typically characterized by the use of money. Diamond [9] explicitly takes
money into account by distinguishing between unemployed, buyers, and sellers. Here we
assume that buying and selling simultaneously take place. None of the results are sensitive
to this assumption.
11respectively. Under the assumption of a steady state, dVu=dt = dVm=dt = 0
and the value equations are given by:
½Vu = a(Vm ¡ Vu ¡ c);
½Vm = b(m)(ym + Vu ¡ Vm):
This set of equations can be rewritten in terms of Vu: Since unemployed
agents on the market always have the possibility of not accepting aproduction






b(m)(ym ¡ c) ¡ ½c





De…nition 1 is now completely determined by equations (1)-(4). Together
with the steady state condition that _ m = 0 this describes the long-run equi-
librium.
3 Equilibrium
Based on the steady state assumption, this section explores the consequences
of di¤erent assumptions on the shape of the valuation ratio µ(m). We stay
close to the disquisition in the introduction and section 2.1. Thus in sec-
tion 3.1 we examine the steady state solutions when the valuation ratio µ is
monotonically decreasing in the market size and in section 3.2 we allow for
an increasing part of the µ-curve for large market sizes. Finally, comparative
statics are provided in section 3.3. Throughout we use the notion of a short-
run equilibrium whenever _ m = 0 and of a long-run equilibrium when _ m = 0
and, in addition, de…nition 1 is satis…ed.
3.1 Complete Commodi…cation
Where markets replace social relations we speak of commodi…cation. Com-
plete or full commodi…cation indicates a situation in which markets expand
to an extent where all social relations are abolished. Under incomplete or
partial commodi…cation social relations are still embedded in the commu-
nity, but are partly driven out by the existence of markets. In this section
9We exlude negative values of Vu by assuming that agents can choose for complete
idleness with Vu = 0.
12we consider the case where µ is monotonically decreasing in the market size
(for reasons given in the introduction and section 2.1). As it turns out, this
is a situation where, if any, full commodi…cation results.
Figure 3 below depicts this case10. The Er and Eu curves show respec-
tively the LHS and the RHS of the enforceability constraint in de…nition 1.
Therefore, whenever the Er lies above the Eu curve reciprocal exchange is
enforceable, and for market sizes where Eu lies above Er agents maximize
expected utility by entering the market. The value of being unemployed
increases in the market size and is therefore upward sloping. The value of
reciprocal exchange depends on the valuation ratio µ(m) and is therefore
downward sloping. The curves are drawn for the range [0; ~ m]. These are
the possible short-run equilibrium market sizes. The upper limit is given by
~ m; the maximum possible market size for which no agents are involved in
reciprocal exchange, i.e. r = 0:11 The critical value of the market size at
which the enforceability constraint holds with equality is given by m1. At
all market sizes m · m1 reciprocal exchange is enforceable. Whenever the
market size for some reason exceeds the critical size m1 the market size is too
large for reciprocal exchange to be enforceable and eventually all agents will
enter the market. This cannot be a long-run equilibrium. The only possible
long-run equilibria are when economy ends up in a corner solution12. As ap-
pears from equation (3) the long-run equilibrium in case people opt for the
market regime equals ~ m: Thus we see that for some market sizes reciprocal
exchange is enforceable and that for larger market sizes the economy will
converge to a market exchange economy. It is clear from the picture that
if the Eu curve is everywhere above (below) the Er curve then reciprocal is
never (always) enforceable no matter what the market size is13.
10The following set of parameters is used to obtain the …gure: fa;b;c;g;h;ym;±g =
f:8;:6;1;¡:1;:3;8;:8g where we assumed that the probability of …nding a trading partner
on the market is linear in m: b(m) = b¢m and the subjective valution is given by µ(m) =
h + gm: This set of parameters assures that both exchange mechanisms are enforceable
for some market sizes for a value of µ in the range: µ < µ < µ. (see section 3.3).
11Thus from equation 3 and the de…nition of short-run equilibrium ~ m is such that
a(1 ¡ ~ m) = b(~ m) ¢ ~ m:
12By a corner solution, we mean that either the economy sticks to its initial market size
(possibly at a positive level) or converges to a market size of ~ m:
13However, Vu = 0 at m = 0 and if Er is everywhere below Eu then Er must be negative.













In the previous section, the valuation of reciprocal exchange was assumed
to be monotonically decreasing in the market size. However, as mentioned
earlier (notably in section 2.1) it is more likely that the valuation depends on
the market size in a slightly more sophisticated way. Despite the decreasing
disutility costs of changing beliefs, the feeling of a social de…cit that cannot be
repaired becomes distressingly oppressive and the wish for sustaining existing
reciprocal relationships becomes increasingly weighty. Thus we have that
µ(m) is …rst decreasing in m and after some point increasing in m. The
Er curve will for that reason behave similarly because of its dependency on
µ(m). Figure 4 below depicts this case14.
14Here fa;b;c;g;h;j;ym;±g = f:8;:6;1;¡:24;:24;:7;8;:8g where b(m) is as in footnote













An interesting feature of the variable subjective valuation is the possibil-
ity of multiple interior equilibria. For example, in the …gure above there are
two interior equilibria, of which one is stable (m3). For small market sizes
below m2 the search costs are too high to enter the market. However, at
larger market sizes the search costs are lower and the subjective valuation of
the market is higher. This is true for all market sizes between m2 and m3.
Reciprocal exchange is no longer enforceable and agents enter the market.
But contrary to the case in the previous section where µ is monotonically
decreasing and where eventually everybody would be engaged in market ex-
change, there is a point m3 at which the market is so large that agents have
relatively high preferences for reciprocal exchange again. At this point, the
market will stop growing and part of the population will stay in their recipro-
cal exchange relationship. An interior long-equilibrium solution is therefore
obtained, potentially explaining why gift exchange continues to exist in the
contemporary environment that is chie‡y market oriented.
3.3 Valuation, Patience, and Viability.
Next, we turn to comparative statics. In general, reciprocal exchange can
be enforceable for some small market sizes but not for large markets. The
extent to which reciprocal exchange is enforceable is …rst of all obviously
depending on the relative valuation (µ) of reciprocal exchange. Likewise, it
depends on the discount rate (±)which can alternatively be interpreted as a
15measure of trust (see also section 2.2). The next two propositions typify the
general relation between the two variables.
Proposition 1 For every ± 2 (0;1) there exist positive µ(±) such that 8µ(m) ¸
µ(±) reciprocal exchange is enforceable and 8µ(m) < µ(±) reciprocal exchange
is not enforceable. µ(±) is …rst decreasing in ± and then, if µ(m) > µ(0) for
some m, possibly increasing in ±.
Proposition 2 For every ± 2 (0;1) there exist positive µ(±) such that 8µ(m) ¸
µ(±) market exchange is not enforceable and 8µ(m) < µ(±) market exchange
is enforceable. µ(±)is …rst decreasing in ± and then possibly increasing in ±.
Proof. All proofs of the propositions appear in the appendix.
Based on these propositions, …gure 5 represents the typical shape of the









In this …gure, we plotted the areas for which reciprocal exchange is not
enforceable for any market size, for which it is enforceable at positive market
sizes, and for which it is enforceable at any market size. The latter implies
that market exchange is not enforceable at any market size. Thus for exam-
ple, at e1 reciprocal exchange is not enforceable at any market size (µ < µ),
whereas at e3 market exchange is not enforceable at any market size (µ > µ).
The point e2 is an in-between case where at some market sizes, but not all,
reciprocal exchange is enforceable, and at some market sizes market exchange
16is enforceable. The latter case is exactly the one which …gures 2 and 3 are
based on. In contrast, e3 for instance would describe the case where the Eu
curve lies entirely above the Er curve.
As can be seen from Figure 5, at higher discount factors reciprocal ex-
change is enforceable at lower values of µ. In other words, when the discount
factor or the measure of trust is low, cheating is relatively pro…table and
the subjective valuation of the reciprocal good must consequently be high
for reciprocal exchange to be enforceable. Exactly the reverse is true for the
case of market exchange, i.e. at higher discount factors, it becomes less likely
that market exchange is enforceable15.
Here we have a resemblance with optimal contract theory. For example
in Baker et al. [5] a …rm has to choose an optimal bonus system. They
can either rely on an objective but imperfect performance measure or on an
unbiased but not objectively measurable variable. In the former case the …rm
can rely on an explicit contract (we loosely interpret this as the money reward
in case of the market exchange), in the latter only on an implicit contract
(i.e. based on trust). They show that under appropriate conditions, the
optimal contract is a combination of the implicit and the explicit contract.
But whenever the discount rate is su¢ciently high only implicit contracts
should be used whereas for su¢ciently low discount rates one should rely on
explicit contracts only.
4 Welfare
In this section we take a welfare perspective by comparing the e¢ciency of
stable equilibria. We follow Kranton [16] by taking the weighted discounted
lifetime utility of agents on the market as the measure of comparison, but
none of the results hinge on this. The weights are the shares of the employed











Evidently, Vu · Vw · Vm: Since both Vu and Vm are increasing in the
market size, so is Vw: We now state:
15The interpretation that for high discount rates the µ and µ curves can be increasing
is somewhat complicated and is therefore deferred to the appendix.
17Proposition 3 It is possible that there exist stable equilibria which are Pareto-
dominated by other equilibria. As a consequence, ine¢cient market sizes can
be sustained.
Proposition 3 relies on a rather strong criterium of Pareto-optimality,
namely where state i is socially preferred to state j if in state j no agent
is worse-o¤ than in state i and at least one is better o¤, without taking
into account the possibility of income redistributions. This is stronger than
the Kaldor-Hicks criterium and the Pareto-criterium where income redistri-
bution is allowed. Clearly, under the weaker versions of Pareto-optimality
proposition 3 is as well satis…ed.
The rational behind proposition 3 is intuitively clear. The reason that
dominated stable equilibria can be maintained is caused by the existence of an
external e¤ect and a coordination failure. In essence, if reciprocal exchange is
initially large, search costs on the market are high, even though search costs
would be low if the market was large. Similarly, if the market starts out
large, search costs are low and reciprocal exchange relationship may not be
enforceable even though if the market was small they would be preferable in
value terms. Besides this thick-market externality there is also a coordination
failure. People do not take into account the full value of a reciprocal trade
in deciding between market and reciprocal exchange. A social planner would
value reciprocal exchange by its present value: Vr. But individuals only take
into consideration the value of reciprocal trade for which it can be trusted
upon that the relationship can be maintained: ¡c + ±Vr (see de…nition 1).
The gap between those values can be considered as a coordination failure
caused by mutual distrust. As a consequence, if the market starts out large,
there can be a degree of trust that is insu¢cient to maintain the reciprocal
exchange relationship even though if it could be maintained it would be
superior to market exchange in value terms. Proposition 3 is illustrated














In the upper panel of …gure 6 the initial market size is denoted by m±.
At m±, de…nition 1 is not satis…ed, and the economy tends to move to ~ m, the
maximum sustainable market size (r = 0)16: It is immediately seen that at
~ m the value of being in a reciprocal exchange relationship is higher than that
of being on the market: Vr > Vw. Therefore, if all agents would be involved
in reciprocal exchange they would all be better o¤. The lower panel of the
16It is evident that the economy could as well converge to a stable interior equilibrium
such as m3 in …gure 4.
19…gure illustrates the case where reciprocal exchange is sustainable although
everyone could in principle be better o¤ by entering the market.
The preceding analysis shows that individual agents need not necessarily
select the socially most e¢cient exchange mechanism nor that there is any
tendency towards a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. There are of course ways
to change incentives towards the …rst best solution, such as a subsidy on
entering the market or lowering search costs in one way or another. Due to the
hysteresis present such a subsidy need only be a temporary one. Stimulation
to form reciprocal relationships seems to be of a more di¢cult order. A one-
sided inquiry into the market mechanism clearly would disguise aspects of
critical importance.
5 Concluding Remarks
Many economic activities imply a certain gift-dimension. In the literature
gifts are discussed from di¤erent perspectives (see for example Vandevelde
[18]). In this paper we hold the view that the logic of the gift contains
some notion of reciprocity. There are no free gifts in case the institution of
gift-giving is considered as a coordination mechanism to cope with the state
of nature. Market exchange and gift exchange have therefore something in
common: the reference to the notion of reciprocity. But reciprocal exchange
is based on personal relationships and trust whereas market exchange is based
on anonymity and money.
If there are two distinct modes of exchanging goods the question arises
whether these modes are in some sense commensurable. Here again we take
sides by assuming that market exchange and reciprocal exchange are com-
mensurable by extending preferences. Gift-giving, and thus reciprocal ex-
change, renders symbolic utility as people value the idea of belonging to a
group or society at large. Symbolic utility and substantive utility, which
relates to traditional economic activities, are di¤erent components of the
extended utility function.
Starting from these premises the main question to be answered is un-
der which circumstances reciprocal exchange is viable and not crowded-out
by the market regime. Such a form of crowding-out can be conceived as a
complete commodi…cation of society. Following Kranton [16] reciprocal ex-
change is modelled in a strict manner. Agents expect a counter-performance.
Market exchange is modelled as a search process where in case of matching
20goods are exchanged immediately. The model is closed by introducing an en-
forceability condition showing under which conditions agents defect in case
of reciprocal exchange. The condition critically depends on the market size
and one the discount factor. The latter has its resemblance in the optimal
contract literature once we loosely interpret market exchange as an explicit
contract and a reciprocal relation as an implicit contract.
It is shown that complete commodi…cation obtains if symbolic utility
declines as the relative size of the market increases. However, reciprocal
exchange may survive for low subjective discount rates which are in some
sense indicative for a high level of trust. There is another reason why full
commodi…cation may not be the equilibrium outcome. Symbolic utility may
rise if reciprocity becomes scarce as the market takes over. In the end people
may be aware of a social loss and revalue reciprocal exchange accordingly.
As a result commodi…cation will stop at some point and there will be an
interior equilibrium solution with market exchange and reciprocal exchange
coexisting.
From a welfare point of view full or partial commodi…cation is not neces-
sarily superior to reciprocal exchange. It is shown that agents need not nec-
essarily select the exchange mechanism that is Pareto-optimal. This result
is related to the search externality in market exchange and the coordination
failure in reciprocal exchange. If the market is large initially, search costs are
low and the economy may converge to an ine¢cient outcome. Similarly, the
economy may converge to an ine¢cient outcome if the coordination failure
with respect to the choice of reciprocal exchange is important.
What seems most urgent in additional research is a more ‡exible way of
modellingreciprocal exchange to cope with the di¤erent aspects of gift-giving.
In particular, it may be rewarding to shed some light on intergenerational
gifts, where reciprocity in the usual sense is out of reach or where the time
interval is extremely long. The latter is for example the case in family re-
lationships where parents take care of their children in the hope of mutual
care once they themselves become dependent on their children’s readiness to
support them. In addition it may well be more realistic to assume that some
goods are more suited to be produced on the market (e.g. bread) and others
to be o¤ered in a reciprocal relationship (e.g. insurance). Individuals can be
assumed to be heterogeneous and spend their time in di¤erent proportions
over the two exchange mechanisms. Another interesting question emenates
from the paradox formulated by Etzioni ([10], p. 250): ”The more people
accept the neoclassical paradigm as a guide for their behavior, the more the
21ability to sustain a market economy is undermined”. The paradox suggest
that market exchange becomes less e¢cient if morality is on the retreat. This
need not be true, as our analyisis suggests, but it certainly deserves serious
consideration.
226 Appendix
In this appendix we …rst showthatde…nition 1characterizes aNash-equilibrium
and subsequently proof propositions 1 to 3. Where no confusion can arise we
simply write µ instead of, for example, µ(m).
Proof that Definition 1 is a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the payo¤ matrix below. Players are denoted by P and C,
the agent that produces and the one that consumes …rst respectively. They
can either be honest, H; or cheat, D (defect). The pay-o¤s are in utility
terms. As an example, consider P playing honest and C cheating, then P
produces the good, bearing cost in utility terms of c and enters the market the
next period after …nding out of being cheated, ±Vu: C consumes yr, does not
produce in return and enters the market getting ±Vu: Thus in the upper-right
cell we have the pay-o¤s ¡c+±Vu and yr +±Vu: Consider then the strategies
fH;Hg: This can, by construction, only be a (weak) Nash-equilibrium if it
is in both players advantage not to deviate: ¡c + ±yr + ±
2Vr ¸ ±Vu and
¡c + ±Vr ¸ Vu. Fortunately, we can show that …rst inequality is implied by
the second. Note that 1
(1¡±)yr ¸ 1
2(1¡±)(yr ¡ cr) = Vr (see equation 2). Then
±yr + ±
2Vr ¸ ±Vr. If now ¡c + ±Vr ¸ Vu (second constraint) then it is surely
the case that ¡cr + ±yr + ±
2Vr ¸ Vu ¸ ±Vu which proves the …rst inequality.
Finally note that fD;Dg is always a (weak) Nash-equilibrium.
P #;C ! H D
H ¡c + ±yr + ±
2Vr;yr ¡ ±c + ±
2Vr ¡c + ±Vu;yr + ±Vu
D ±Vu;±Vu ±Vu;±Vu
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof. We try to …nd values of µ for which de…nition 1 is satis…ed with
equality: ¡c + ±Vr = Vu: Label this equality D1. For this value agents are
indi¤erent between reciprocal exchange and entering the market given the
market size. For higher values of µ they prefer reciprocal exchange, for lower
values they prefer market exchange. In particular we try to …nd values of
µ, say µ, for which the equality is satis…ed but will not be satis…ed for any
lower µ for any market size. It is instructive …rst to consider the case where
µ is (weakly) monotonically decreasing in m and then generalize the results,
as in the main text. The advantage of this is that if reciprocal exchange is
enforceable at all, it is certainly enforceable at m = 0 since Vr is decreasing
in m and Vu increasing in m. Thus, we can focus on m = 0. Then D1 reads,
23by restricting Vu to R+:
1
2±(µym + c) ¡ c
1 ¡ ±
= 0: (A1)
Since we put no restrictions on µ, given any ± 2 (0;1) there exists a µ
such that the equality holds (and is in this particular case easy to …nd). (As
a marginal comment, note that as ± ! 1, the numerator of the LHS of A1
approaches 1
2(µym ¡ c) which equals zero for some 0 < µ · 1.). Since the
LHS of D1 is increasing in ±, µ is lower for higher values of ±.
Generalizing the argument, we see that the RHS can be positive for mar-
kets m > 0, but also that µ(m) may be larger than µ(0). So even if the
equality holds at m = 0, it may well be that the LHS is larger than the
RHS at positive market sizes. The critical value of µ (i.e. µ)can therefore be
lower than the value of µ for which the equality holds at m = 0. The caveat
in the generalization is, however, the fact that Vu is now increasing in ± as
well. At m = 0, Vu = 0 no matter what the rate of time preference is. This
remains true up to the market size where Vu becomes strictly positive. For
the range of values for which Vu is strictly positive, Vu is also increasing in ±.
Thus both sides can be increasing in ± at some market sizes, and the relation
between µ and ± becomes ambiguous. We stress however that for low values
of ±, Vu = 0, and hence there exists an interval where µ and ±are negatively
correlated. The intuition behind this increasing part is that because on the
market costs are made before revenues, for su¢ciently low discount rate the
present value is negative, whilst in a reciprocal exchange with some prob-
ability you consume before you produce and so even for low (but positive)
disount rates expected gains are positive for some valuation ratio.
As a special case, if µ(m) · µ(0) 8m (in other words µ is nonincreasing),
then µ can be determined by inspection of m = 0 alone (since if then recip-
rocal exchange is not enforceable at m, and since Vu is nondecreasing and Vr
nonincreasing in the market size, then it is not enforceable at any m). Since
at m = 0; Vu = 0, if the disount rate increases a little, Vu remains zero but Vr
increases so µ unambiguously declines. But note that such an unambiguously
declining µ-curve is only a special case and that it is not directly related to
the shape of µ(m).
The same line of argument can be used to derive proposition 2. Here the
aim is …nding the µ such that market exchange is just enforceable at one
particular market size, and not for any higher µ. We …rst try to …nd µ in the
24case of nonincreasing µ so that the focus can be restricted to m = 1: We do
not state the proof here.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. The proof consists of showing that it need not be contradictory to
have a stable equilibrium that is ine¢cient in the sense that it is Pareto-
dominated by another stable equilibrium. Denote the two equilibria under
investigation by mi and me (the subscripts stand for ine¢cient, e¢cient).
Let the initial point be the ine¢cient equilibrium mi. Three cases are to be
considered: 1. mi is at one of the corners of the economy. If mi = 0 then it
is stable if ¡c + ±Vr ¸ Vu: 2. If m = ~ m then it is stable if ¡c + ±Vr > Vu: 3.
mi is an interior solution. It is stable if ¡c + ±Vr = Vu and if ± dVr
dmi ¸ dVu
dmi.




Additionally, the enforceability constraints have to be satis…ed as indi-
cated at mi and me. Consider for example the case where mi is the corner
solution m = 0 and me is an interior stable solution that Pareto-dominates
the corner solution. Thus we have:
Vr(me) ¸ Vr(0);
Vw(me) ¸ Vw(0);
¡c + ±Vr(0) ¸ Vu(0):
¡c + ±Vr(me) = Vu(me)
The second inequality is naturally satis…ed. (Indeed, since V
0
w(m) > 0,
the only case where an equilibrium can be dominated by a smaller market
size is where m = 0 since otherwise all remaining market participants would
lose some welfare. Except, of course, when nobody stays!). Since we put no
restrictions on µ the …rst inequality can be satis…ed as well (not, however,
when µ(m) is nonincreasing in the market size). Combining the (in)equalities
we see that as long as Vr is increasing over the interval [0;me] (but remember
that it may be decreasing in the …rst stage and increasing thereafter), but
not as fast as Vu there is no inconsistency and it cannot be ruled out that
m = 0 is indeed ine¢cient. Other cases can be analyzed in a similar manner
and are omitted. The result of possible ine¢ciency is easily extended to the
25nonweighted case for Vm;Vu; and Vw all behave in a similar way (namely
increasing in the market size).
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